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Attempts to elucidate the kinds of “thing” or “things” to which the term shamanic journeying 
image is referentially linked must grapple with two related questions: what is the funda-
mental nature of shamanic journeying images, and how might the origin of a shamanic 
journeying image be found? The first question is ontological, concerned with the nature 
and essence of shamanic journeying images. In contrast, the second is epistemological and 
methodolgical, concerned with how to acquire knowledge of shamanic journeying images. 
We demonstrate how inductive and deductive reasoning, the private language argument, 
and reification render problematic the resolution of both. Finally, we present a method to 
preliminarily formulate an ontology and epistemology of shamanic journeying imagery.
Some Rudimentary Problems 
Pertaining to the Construction 
of an Ontology and Epistemology 
of Shamanic Journeying Imagery
                               Adam J. Rock Stanley Krippner1
                                  Deakin University Saybrook Graduate School
                           Melbourne, VIC, Australia San Francisco, CA, USA
The term shamanism typically refers to “a group of techniques by which its practitioners enter the ‘spirit world,’ purportedly obtaining information 
that is used to help and to heal members of their social 
group” (Krippner, 2000, p. 93). Several researchers 
(e.g., Heinze, 1991; Ripinsky-Naxon, 1993) argue that 
this information is accessed during altered states of 
consciousness (ASCs), principally those ASCs involving 
soul flight (i.e., ecstatic journeying; Krippner, 2002). That 
is to say, shamanic practices (e.g., ingesting psychoactive 
plants, sonic driving, ritualized dancing) ostensibly 
produce shifts in consciousness which Harner (1990) 
referred to as shamanic states of consciousness. In other 
papers (e.g., Rock & Krippner, 2007a, 2007b), we have 
provided our rationale for replacing the term shamanic 
state of consciousness with shamanic pattern of phenomenal 
properties, and will use the latter term throughout this 
article. 
Noll (1985) asserted that an integral feature 
of shamanism is the utilization of “…techniques for 
inducing, maintaining, and interpreting the experience 
of enhanced visual mental imagery” (p. 445). Similarly, 
Peters (1989) stated that, “The shaman is a visualizer…” 
(p. 130) who relies on this modality to access 
transpersonal realms.  Indeed, Houran, Lange, and 
Crist-Houran (1997) analyzed 30 phenomenological 
reports concerning shamanic journeying, derived from 
Harner (1990), and found that 93.3% emphasized visual 
phenomena. Shamanic visualizations (i.e., journeying 
imagery) typically reflect one’s cultural cosmology 
(Krippner, 1990; Walsh, 1995, 2007), which tends to 
be a multi-layered universe consisting of an upper world, 
middle world (the terrestrial world or Earth) and lower 
world (Ellwood, 1987).2 
 In recent years, shamanic practices have generated 
increasing interest as a complementary therapeutic 
strategy in the traditional medical and psychological 
arenas (Bittman et al., 2001). Consequently, it may prove 
prudent to further investigate the nature of shamanic 
patterns of phenomenal properties (e.g., journeying 
imagery). Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there exists 
a lacuna in the literature with regards to a systematic 
analysis of the philosophical problems that hamper 
the development of an ontology and epistemology of 
shamanic journeying imagery.
Ontology may be defined as “the matter of 
what there is in the world” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 41); it 
is concerned with “an overall conception of how things 
are” (Heil, 1998, p. 6). The term ontological foundations 
refers to the fundamental nature or essence of a particular 
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variable, X (e.g., a shamanic journey image). For example, 
an ontologist might be concerned with whether the kind 
of thing that a shamanic journeying image is referentially 
linked to is imaginal (e.g., derived from material stored 
in one’s long-term memory system) or transpersonal (i.e., 
independent of the percipient’s mind-body complex) 
(Walsh, 1990).
In contrast, epistemology may be defined as 
the study of the “origins, nature, methods, and limits of 
human knowledge” (Reber & Reber, 2001, p. 246). With 
regards to shamanic patterns of phenomenal properties, 
one might, for example, investigate the epistemological 
process that results in a percipient becoming aware of 
a shamanic journeying image. While epistemological 
debates in the philosophy of religion have tended to focus 
on mystical experience (e.g., Evans, 1989; Forman, 1996; 
Gill, 1984; Katz, 1978, 1983; Stoeber, 1991), one might 
contend that the epistemological problems discussed 
are also applicable to shamanic patterns of phenomenal 
properties. For example, there is no reason in principle 
why the epistemological issue of whether mystical 
experience is shaped conceptually and linguistically 
by one’s cultural milieu is not applicable to shamanic 
patterns of phenomenal properties. Indeed, a recent series 
of papers (e.g., Rock & Baynes, 2005, 2007) investigated 
the extent to which shamanic journeying imagery is 
shaped by contextual influences (e.g., the shaman’s 
cultural cosmology and autobiographical memories).3
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how 
various philosophical problems impede the formulation 
of an ontology and epistemology of shamanic journeying 
imagery. We proceed by demonstrating that the problem 
of induction constitutes an inherent limitation associated 
with recent experimental studies investigating the origin 
of shamanic journeying imagery. Subsequently, we 
develop and critique a deductive argument concerning the 
ontology of shamanic journeying imagery. Wittgenstein’s 
(1958) private language argument and the fallacy of 
reification are also considered in the context of shamanic 
journeying imagery. Finally, we present a methodology 
that arguably constitutes a preliminary step towards the 
formulation of an ontology and epistemology of shamanic 
journeying imagery.
Previous Experimental Research 
Concerning the Origins 
of Shamanic Journeying Imagery
Attempts to elucidate the kinds of thing or things that the term shamanic journeying image is referentially 
linked to may prompt one to address two intimately 
related questions: (1) What is the fundamental nature of 
shamanic journeying images? (2) How might one find the 
origin of a shamanic journeying image? The first question 
is ontological; that is, it is concerned with the nature and 
essence of the shamanic journeying image. In contrast, 
the second is an epistemological and methodological 
question; it relates to how one might acquire certain 
knowledge.  It is arguable that 1 and 2 are inextricably 
bound at a fundamental level. That is to say, answering 2 
presumably provides one with the methodology necessary 
to address 1.  
Rock and Baynes (2005, 2007) addressed 2 by 
developing a non-hypnotic version of Watkins’ (1971) 
Affect Bridge (a hypnotic technique used to uncover the 
origin of an affect) for the purpose of investigating the 
origins of shamanic journeying imagery. The Modified 
Affect Bridge was developed as one potential partial 
solution to 2; it was not designed to facilitate unrestricted 
access to one’s unconscious material, but rather to facilitate 
ordinary remembering among ordinary participants in 
a non-clinical context. The Modified Affect Bridge was 
first applied in an experimental context by Rock, Casey 
and Baynes (2006) and, subsequently, Rock (2006).
Rock, Casey, and Baynes (2006) reported that 
ostensibly shamanic journey images encountered by 
naïve participants journeying to the lower world with 
the aid of monotonous drumming at 8 beats-per-second 
for 15 minutes were just as likely to be derived from 
autobiographical memories as spontaneous visual mental 
images reported by naïve participants assigned to the 
control condition of sitting quietly with eyes open for 15 
minutes. This finding suggests that the epistemological 
process that results in one being consciously aware 
of an ostensibly shamanic journeying image involves 
memory recall and superimposition within one’s 
phenomenal space. Consequently, the journeying images 
may be tentatively assigned an imaginal ontological 
status. Subsequently, Rock (2006) randomly allocated 
participants to counterbalanced factorial combinations of 
a repeated-measures factor and a between-groups factor. 
The repeated-measures factor consisted of four stimulus 
conditions (i.e., monotonous drumming, Ganzfeld, 
relaxation, sitting quietly with eyes open). The between-
groups factor consisted of three sets of instructions (i.e., 
journeying to the lower world with or without religious 
instructions, no instructions). It was concluded that visual 
mental images encountered while journeying to the lower 
world were derived primarily from autobiographical 
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memories. Other visual mental images were tentatively 
labelled as symbolic, transpersonal, and indeterminate.
The results of Rock, Casey, and Baynes (2006) and 
Rock (2006) facilitated the development of a tentative four-
fold ostensibly shamanic journeying imagery origin typology 
consisting of autobiographical, symbolic, transpersonal 
and indeterminate sources. An ostensibly shamanic 
journeying image may be categorized as autobiographical 
if it appears to be the derivative of an autobiographical 
memory, that is, a “memory for events that have occurred 
in one’s life” (Reber & Reber, 2001, p. 423). The symbolic 
characterization of an ostensibly shamanic journeying 
image is invoked if the image seems to perform a symbolic 
function without appearing to mentally represent a 
previous sensory experience. An ostensibly shamanic 
journeying image may be conceptualized as transpersonal 
if the image appears to be linked to something that exists 
independently of the participant’s mind-body complex. 
Finally, an indeterminate status is conferred upon an 
ostensibly shamanic journeying image if the participant 
is unable to isolate its origin (Rock & Baynes, 2007).
Given that the Modified Affect Bridge was 
formulated as a potential partial solution to 2, and 
has yielded four imagery-origin categories thereby 
addressing 1, it might be asked, “How might one resolve 
the ontological foundations of shamanic journeying 
imagery?” In this context, it may be efficacious to consider 
Mercante’s (2008) suggestion that a persuasive argument 
for considering imagery associated with the Ayahuasca 
experience (i.e., miração, singular; mirações, plural) an 
“involuntary and spontaneous process is that voluntary 
events rely on memory” (pp. 6-7). Extrapolating from 
Farthing’s (1992) discussion of mental imagery to 
miração, Mercante (2008) wrote:
If the arrival and dissipation of mirações were subject 
to the command of the individual, it would follow 
that no “alien” elements (outside a person’s familiar 
universe) would be present.... The idea is that one can 
only voluntarily manipulate images that are impressed 
upon the memory through sensation. Not that a 
person cannot assemble new patterns from recorded 
sensory data, but he or she cannot manufacture 
fundamental data beyond the pale of experience. The 
revelatory qualities of the miração would be lost or at 
least considered illusory if the experience of it were 
limited to the cache of existing memory (pp. 6-7).
One may apply Mercante’s (2008) argument 
to shamanic journeying imagery and contend that if 
shamanic journeying images are immune to voluntarily 
manipulation, then shamanic journeying images are not 
constructed from material derived from a percipients’ 
long-term memory system. Ethnographic data, however, 
suggests that shamans tend to cultivate a mastery over 
journeying images (e.g., Noll, 1985), thus indicating—
provided one accepts Mercante’s (2008) preceding 
argument—that shamanic journeying imagery is the 
result of an epistemological process involving memory 
recall and superimposition within a percipient’s 
phenomenal space. 
 Furthermore, it is arguable that even if the 
outward appearance of a shamanic journeying image, X, 
is derived from material stored in a percipient’s long-term 
memory system, this does not necessarily preclude the 
ontological foundations of X from being transpersonal. 
For example, if a shaman or experimental participant 
encounters a predatory creature during a journey to 
the lower world—and the outward appearance of this 
predatory creature is the derivative of an autobiographical 
memory—it remains possible that the predatory creature 
is merely the manifestation or persona of an external 
entity. Strassman (2001), for instance, suggested that 
entities encountered during dimethyltryptamine-
induced patterns of phenomenal properties tend to 
manifest in forms recognizable to the percipient (e.g., 
“elves,” “aliens,” “angels,” “deceased relatives”), and yet 
may reside in parallel universes or dark matter realms. 
Problems of Induction and Deduction
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that there are six necessary conditions (hereafter N1…N6) for a 
visual mental image to qualify as a shamanic journeying 
image and that the conjunction of N1…N6 constitutes 
a sufficient condition. Let us further assume that N6 
states that the ontological foundations of a visual mental 
image, X, must be Y (where Y is currently unknown). An 
ontologist might be concerned with whether the kind of 
thing (i.e., denoted by Y ) that a shamanic journeying 
image is referentially linked to is imaginal (i.e., a 
projection of the shaman’s mental set) or transpersonal 
(i.e., independent of the shaman’s mind-body complex) 
(Walsh, 1990). 
Future research might formulate an a posteriori 
derived definition for Y by comparing Xs that satisfy 
N1…N5 (group 1) with Xs that satisfy four or less of 
the aforementioned necessary conditions (group 2). 
Specifically, one may use the Modified Affect Bridge to 
investigate whether group 1 is associated with different 
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categories of Ys compared to group 2. Given that group 
2 does not satisfy N1…N5 (N6 notwithstanding), the 
ostensible shamanic journeying image status of this group 
is falsified. In contrast, the constituents of group 1 have 
not been falsified because they satisfy N1…N5. If it is 
observed that all of the constituents of groups 1 are derived 
from, for example, a transpersonal source, then one might 
tentatively infer that Y is a transpersonal source and, 
thus, N6 would state that the ontological foundations of a 
visual mental image, X, must be transpersonal. However, 
if, for instance, some constituents of group 1 appear 
to be derived from a transpersonal source, while other 
constituents of group 1 do not, then it may be such that 
the transpersonal constituents of group 1 are shamanic 
journeying images and, thus, Y is a transpersonal source; 
whereas the non-transpersonal constituents of group 1 
are merely visual mental images. That is, if N6, in fact, 
states that the ontological foundations of a visual mental 
image, X, must be transpersonal, then the transpersonal 
constituents of Group 1 satisfy N1…N6, which is 
a sufficient condition for qualifying as a shamanic 
journeying image. In contrast, the ostensible shamanic 
status of the non-transpersonal constituents of group 1 
would be falsified on the grounds that these constituents 
fail to satisfy N6. It is, of course, logically possible that 
Y, in fact, denotes a non-transpersonal source and, thus, 
the non-transpersonal constituents of group 1 satisfy 
N1…N6, while the transpersonal constituents of group 1 
would be falsified. 
 However, if one were able to definitively 
demonstrate that shamanic journeying images X1, X2, 
X3…X10 were all derived from, for example, transpersonal 
sources, then to presuppose that X11 is also derived 
from a transpersonal source is to commit the fallacy 
of induction, that is, moving from particular instances 
to general principles. For example, Rosenberg (2000) 
suggested that the observation “that the sun has risen 
many days in the past is good grounds to believe it will do 
so tomorrow, but does not make it logically certain that 
it will” (p. 177). Consequently, induction is inherently 
limited. Additionally, if the ontological foundations were 
different for X1, X2, X3…X10 (e.g., autobiographical for X1 
and X2, symbolic for X10, indeterminate for X7 and X8), 
then one might contend that such variability hampers 
N6’s usefulness as a necessary condition. 
Similarly, deductive models (i.e., moving from 
general principles to particular instances) are inherently 
limited. For example, one may formulate a logically valid 
argument concerning the identity of Y but there is no 
guarantee that such an argument is logically sound. 
Consider the following deductive argument:
1. All shamanic journeying images are derived 
from transpersonal sources;
2. X is a shamanic journeying image;
3. Therefore X is derived from a transpersonal 
source.
It may be observed that while the preceding argument’s 
conclusion follows logically from its premises, it may of 
course be such that all shamanic journeying images are 
not derived from transpersonal sources. 
The aforementioned problems associated with 
attempts to formulate an ontology and epistemology 
of shamanic journeying imagery using inductive 
or deductive reasoning are further complicated by 
Wittgenstein’s (1958) private language argument and the 
fallacy of reification.
The Private Language Argument
In a private language it is held that terms “refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his 
immediate private sensations. So another person cannot 
understand the language” (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 88-
89). The notion of a private language is underpinned by an 
argument for solipsism: “I can only believe that someone 
else is in pain, but I know if I am” (Wittgenstein, 1958, 
p. 102). A privileged observer (i.e., first-person) may, for 
example, establish a link between the term pain and the 
phenomenal properties of pain. However, it is possible 
that the privileged observer’s private definition may 
be erroneously applied in subsequent instances due to 
false memory impressions concerning the phenomenal 
properties of pain (Malcolm, 1981). Consequently, 
Wittgenstein (1958) asserted that one should, “always 
get rid of the idea of a private object in this way: assume 
that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice 
the change because your memory constantly deceives 
you” (p. 207). To summarize, Wittgenstein’s (1958) 
private language argument undermined: (1) the ability 
of a nonprivileged observer to correctly apprehend the 
meanings of terms applied to phenomenal properties by a 
privileged observer; and (2) the reliability of a privileged 
observer’s application of terms to the phenomenal 
properties known by his or her conscious awareness. 
The epistemological presuppositions associated 
with shamanic journeying imagery are two-fold and 
inextricably related at a fundamental level: (1) a privileged 
observer can, via introspection, know a shamanic 
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journeying image; and (2) a privileged observer may 
communicate the introspected shamanic journeying 
image to a nonprivileged observer. Clearly, in order to 
categorize an image as shamanic one must first learn the 
meaning of the term shamanic. A nonprivileged observer 
might endeavor to learn the meaning of “objects” 
commensurate with a shamanic journeying image, X, 
by attempting to correctly apprehend the meanings of 
linguistic terms applied by a privileged observer to the 
set of constituents associated with X, xyz. However, as 
previously stated, Wittgenstein (1958) asserted that 
such terms “refer to what can only be known to the 
person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So 
another person cannot understand the language” (pp. 
88-89). That is, while a nonprivileged observer may be 
informed that X exhibits a certain set of constituents, 
xyz, Wittgenstein’s (1958) private language argument 
undermined a nonprivileged observer’s ability to correctly 
apprehend the meanings of linguistic terms applied to 
xyz by a privileged observer. Consequently, while it is 
possible that a nonprivileged observer may subsequently 
engage in the privileged observation of xyz, and thus X, 
it is impossible to verify that such a mental event has 
occurred. This epistemological problem is compounded 
by the suggestion that a privileged observer’s false 
memory impressions concerning xyz, and thus X, may 
result in the unreliable application of linguistic terms to 
xyz, and thus X, in future instances. 
This raises a further epistemological problem. 
Tart (1975) emphasized the state-specificity of 
knowledge, while Fischer (1980) asserted that one may 
experience difficulty recalling events that occur “in 
another state of arousal” (p. 306). Consequently, the 
probability of a privileged observer unreliably recalling 
a phenomenal property associated with what Tart (1975) 
referred to as a particular state of consciousness, SoC1, 
due to a false memory impression, may exponentially 
increase when functioning in a SoC other than SoC1 
(e.g., SoC2…n). Consequently, this may compromise a 
privileged observer’s ability to retrospectively assess an 
image as shamanic while functioning in ordinary waking 
consciousness.
The Fallacy of Reification
Reichenbach (1951) employed the axiom sub­stantialization of abstracta to denote the fallacy of 
reification whereby an abstract noun (e.g., consciousness) 
is confused with a thing-like entity. Similarly, Whitehead 
(1946) referred to reification as the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness, which he defined as “…the accidental error 
of mistaking the abstract for the concrete” (p. 66).
An awareness of the fallacy associated with 
reifying consciousness may be observed in James’ 
(1890) contention that “consciousness does not exist,” 
which Chalmers (1996) suggested is interpretable as an 
attempt to argue that consciousness does not exemplify 
the property of thing-ness. Indeed, Klein (1984) stated 
that James (1890) avoided committing the fallacy of 
reification by asserting that consciousness is a function 
or process of knowing, rather than a thing-like entity.
One might argue, with some justification, that 
experimental studies of shamanic journeying imagery 
that use, for example, Pekala’s (1991) Phenomenology of 
Consciousness Inventory (PCI; a 53-item questionnaire that 
purportedly quantifies the structures of consciousness) 
commit an ontological mistake by concretizing mental 
phenomena (e.g., visual mental imagery), thereby 
conflating mentalism with materialism. Pekala (1991) 
has committed the fallacy of reification (Eacker, 
1972) or misplaced concreteness (Whitehead, 1946) 
by attempting to quantify consciousness, and thus 
contravenes James’ (1890) contention that consciousness 
is not a thing-like entity, but rather a function or process 
of knowing (Klein, 1984). Indeed, Pekala (1991) has 
routinely engaged in the kind of fallacious reasoning 
whereby an abstract noun (e.g., “state absorption,” 
“rationality,” “positive affect”) is reified and ascribed 
a numerical value. The problem of reification would 
appear difficult to circumvent, however, given that, 
presently, mental phenomena cannot be investigated via 
the scientific method—and thus measured—until they 
are reified by the assignment of operational definitions 
commensurate with the ontological status of thing-like 
entities. 
 While Wittgenstein’s (1958) private language 
argument and the fallacy of reification problematize the 
findings of shamanic research, it does not necessarily 
follow that the findings are rendered spurious. Indeed, 
a more measured approach might be to develop an 
appreciation of these issues and merely interpret one’s 
results with a suitable level of caution.
A Way Forward
Prior to formulating an ontology and epistemology of shamanic journeying images one must develop 
criteria designed to distinguish shamanic journeying 
images from other images. That is to say, one cannot 
investigate a particular phenomenon if one is bereft 
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of a methodology that may be used to identify that 
phenomenon. 
One may assess the ostensible shamanic status 
of visual mental images using Rock and Krippner’s 
(2008) criteria for the necessary conditions for shamanic 
journeying imagery. The first necessary condition (N1) 
states that a visual mental image, X, must be integrated 
with other visual mental images. The term integrated is 
invoked to underscore that during shamanic journeying 
experiences various visual mental images coalesce to 
form cohesive “geographies” or “landscapes.” N2 states 
that the outward appearance (i.e., form or garb) of X 
must be consistent with a shamanic cosmology. N3 states 
that X must be consistent with the purpose of the specific 
shamanic journey. Finally, N4 states that the function 
of X must be consistent with X. The term function is 
employed to indicate the activities or actions expected 
of X according to a specific shamanic cosmology. If 
an X satisfies N1…N4, then the purported shamanic 
journeying status of X is not falsified. It is noteworthy, 
however, that it does not necessarily follow that X is a 
shamanic journeying image because the conjunction of 
N1…N4 may not constitute a sufficient condition (i.e., 
there may exist other necessary conditions that have been 
overlooked). 
Future research may use Rock and Krippner’s 
(2008) criteria to evaluate Xs reported by participants 
exposed to shamanic techniques (e.g., rhythmic 
drumming). Subsequently, the ontological status of Xs 
that satisfy N1…N4 could be explored. Methodological 
advances in the field of consciousness studies provide 
an indication of how this secondary aim might be 
accomplished. For example, as previous stated, Pekala 
(1991) developed the PCI to ostensibly quantify the 
structures of consciousness. The PCI contains a three-
item dimension that purportedly quantifies one’s 
subjective sense of an altered state of awareness (SSAS; 
e.g., “I felt in an extremely different and unusual state of 
consciousness”). However, there is no reason in principle 
why one’s subjective sense of the imaginal and the 
transpersonal could not be similarly explored. Indeed, 
items could be constructed to quantify the intensity of 
one’s subjective sense that a shamanic journeying image 
is derived from an imaginal or transpersonal source 
(e.g., “The image seemed to be created by my mind” and 
“The image seemed to be linked to an entity beyond my 
personhood,” respectively).
While the aforementioned methodology clearly 
does not resolve the various problems that constitute the 
foci of this paper, it does ostensibly allow researchers 
to: (1) identify shamanic journeying images, and 
(2) assess a percipient’s subjective sense of whether a 
shamanic journeying image is imaginal or transpersonal. 
Consequently, it is arguable that this methodology 
constitutes an initial step towards the formulation of 
an ontology and epistemology of shamanic journeying 
imagery. 
Conclusion
It was suggested that the utility of empirical findings concerning the origins of shamanic journeying imagery 
are inherently limited by the problem of induction. 
Subsequently, we developed a deductive argument 
regarding the ontology of shamanic journeying imagery 
and demonstrated that while the argument was logically 
valid (i.e., the conclusion followed logically from its 
premises), there was no guarantee that the argument was 
logically sound. We further argued that an application 
of Wittgenstein’s (1958) private language argument to 
shamanic journeying imagery undermines: (1) the ability 
of a nonprivileged observer to correctly apprehend the 
meanings of the term shamanic journeying imagery 
applied to phenomenal properties by a privileged 
observer; and (2) the reliability of a privileged observer’s 
application of the term shamanic journeying imagery 
to the phenomenal properties known by his or her 
conscious awareness. Finally, we suggested that attempts 
to quantify the phenomenology of consciousness (e.g., 
journeying imagery) constitute an ontological mistake 
referred to as reification by conflating mentalism with 
materialism.
The inherent inadequacies of methodologies 
underpinned by inductive and deductive reasoning 
coupled with philosophical problems associated with 
reification and a private language referentially linked 
to mental objects facilitates what Walsh (1990) referred 
to as ontological indeterminacy. Indeed, it may not be 
hyperbole to suggest that the fundamental nature of 
shamanic journeying imagery is currently unresolvable 
because there is no absolute method with which to 
examine this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is arguable 
that Rock and Krippner’s (2008) necessary conditions 
for a visual mental image to qualify as a shamanic 
journeying image, coupled with items designed to assess 
a percipient’s subjective sense of whether a shamanic 
journeying image is imaginal or transpersonal, constitute 
an initial step towards the formulation of an ontology 
and epistemology of shamanic journeying imagery.
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Notes
1.  This study was supported, in part, by the Chair 
for Consciousness Studies, Saybrook Graduate 
School.
2.  Shamanic journeying imagery is not restricted to 
any particular sensory modality; that is, journeying 
imagery may be visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, 
tactile or multi-modal (Walsh, 1995). However, 
for the purpose of the present paper, shamanic 
journeying images will be delimited to their visual 
modality because these are arguably the most 
abundant (Houran, Lange, & Crist-Houran, 1997; 
Noll, 1983).
3.  One might argue that philosophical problems, by 
definition, resist empirical testing. It is noteworthy, 
however, that motivation and learning were once 
conceptualized as philosophical problems and, thus, 
held to be incongruent with the methodology of 
science (Eacker, 1972).
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